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Forward Discount Puzzle and Official Interventions:
An Empirical Note
Yuichi FUKUTA and Makoto SAITO ∗
Abstract
In this paper, we explore how official interventions affect the relationship between
current forward rates and future spot rates of the yen/dollar for the period between 1991
and 2004. According to our empirical investigation, Japanese interventions induced not
opposite movements between the two (recognized as the forward discount puzzle), but
an overreaction of future spot rates to current forward discounts, in particular, during
the first half of the 1990s. Our finding demonstrates that official interventions were not
responsible for the forward discount puzzle that was present for the full sample period,
and suggests other factors responsible for the puzzle.
JEL classification: E44, F31.
Keywords: forward discount puzzle, foreign exchange intervention
1 Introduction
Monetary authorities sometimes intervene in foreign exchange markets for policy reasons.1 In
particular, on more than 300 business days since April 1991, the Japanese authority has purchased
U.S. dollars to prevent the Japanese yen from appreciating against the U.S. dollar. If these official
interventions have any effect on future changes in spot rates, they may disturb the relationship
between current forward rates and future spot rates.
In this paper, we examine whether official interventions affect the hypothesis that forward dis-
counts (forward rates minus spot rates) serve as unbiased predictors for subsequent changes in spot
rates. In other words, we explore the extent to which official interventions can resolve the forward
discount puzzle, or the frequently observed opposite movements between current forward discounts
and future spot rates.
∗ The authors acknowledge helpful and encouraging comments from Kentaro Iwatsubo, Kazuhiko Ohashi, Shingo Takagi,
and seminar participants at Hokkaido University, and the Economic and Social Research Institute, the Cabinet Office.
They are also grateful for grants from the Economic and Social Research Institute, the Cabinet Office, Japan. Both
authors are also thankful for grants of the 21st Century Center of Excellence Program of Hitotsubashi University and
Osaka University from the Ministry of Education and Science, Japan.
1 A large literature deals with possible effects of interventions. Sarno and Taylor (2001) survey recent empirical studies of
official interventions.
?fukutasaito : 2007/8/21(9:28)
? 26 ? OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS Vol.57 No.2
Most empirical papers on foreign exchange interventions, including Ito (2003) and Baillie and
Osterberg (1997a, 1997b and 2000), explore immediate market impacts or subsequent effects of offi-
cial interventions on exchange rates, rather than the relationship between current forward discounts
and future changes in spot rates. However, there are not many papers that investigate the effect of
official interventions on forward rates. Among exceptions, Osterberg (1997) examines the relation-
ship between forward discounts and future changes in spot rates. For the period from 1985 to 1991,
he finds that when the U.S. and German governments actively intervened in Deutschmark/U.S. dol-
lar markets, forward discounts of Deutschmarks/U.S. dollars were more biased predictors of future
spot rates. However, he does not explicitly document the extent to which official interventions affect
the bias in forward discounts.
In this paper, we explicitly investigate how official interventions affect the relationship between
current forward discounts and future changes in spot rates. The mere presence of effects of official
interventions on immediate and subsequent spot rates may not completely determine the relation-
ship between current forward discounts and future changes in spot rates. As Fama (1984) demon-
strates, a possible correlation between forward discounts and intervention-induced effects on spot
rates is a key to the relationship, and therefore to a resolution of the forward discount puzzle.
Using the time-series data on yen/U.S. dollar exchange rates between 1991 and 2004, we find that
Japanese interventions did not induce opposite movements between current forward discounts and
future spot rates; rather, it caused an overreaction of future spot rates to forward discounts during
the first half of the 1990s and in a more recent period. That is, while the full sample period did
exhibit the forward discount puzzle, our empirical finding demonstrates that the frequent and large-
scale interventions of the Japanese authority were not responsible for this puzzle, and it suggests
that other effects were sufficiently strong to dominate the observed overreaction.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the statistical specification and
estimation results. In Section 3, we discuss implications of the empirical findings.
2 Specification and estimation
2.1 Data
Our chosen sample period covers April 1, 1991 to December 28, 2004. A major reason for this
choice of sample period is that the Ministry of Finance made time-series data on foreign exchange
interventions public from April 1991. The daily data on Japanese interventions are available from
the web site of Ministry of Finance,2 while data on U.S. interventions are available from the web
site or from the Quarterly Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
For this sample period, the Ministry of Finance reports 343 days on which there was an inter-
vention; 311 days involving dollar purchases and 32 days involving dollar sales. Japanese dollar
purchases and sales interventions amounted to 63,401.7 billion yen and 4,879.4 billion yen, respec-
2 In this dataset, the dates and times of Japanese interventions are based on New York time.
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tively. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports 22 intervention days; 18 days with dollar
purchases and 4 days with dollar sales. U.S. dollar purchases and sales interventions amounted
to 7,345.8 million dollars and 1,033.0 million dollars, respectively. These data demonstrate that
Japanese interventions were much more frequent and aggressive than were U.S. interventions. Note
that the U.S. authority has not intervened in foreign exchange markets since July 1998.
In the context of Japanese interventions, Ito and Yabu (2007) report that the average amount of
intervention per day was 47 billion yen from April 1991 to June 1995, while it was more than 500
billion yen for the period from June 1995 to December 2002. They also point out that the number
of days on which the Japanese authority intervened was 165 days for the period from April 1991
to June 1995, while it was 49 days between June 1995 and December 2002. That is, in the former
period, Japanese interventions were frequent but on a small scale, but were infrequent and on a
large scale in the latter period.
For the period following that considered by Ito and Yabu (2007), Japanese interventions were
extremely aggressive. The Japanese authority intervened on 129 days between January 2003 and
December 2004, and the average amount per day was around 270 billion yen. In addition, the aver-
age number of consecutive days of interventions was 4.3, which is much longer than the averages
for the earlier periods (2.6 days from January 1991 to June 1995, and 1.3 days from June 1995 to
December 2002). Given these differences in the patterns of Japanese interventions, we split the full
sample at June 20, 1995 and at December 31, 2002 to form subperiods.
The yen/dollar spot rate is measured at 17:00 New York time.3 Thus, the spot rate at this point in
time is determined after both Japanese and U.S. interventions have taken place on that day. For the
yen/dollar forward rate, we use as one-week forward discounts, differences in one-week offshore
rates between yen and dollar in Japanese offshore markets. These offshore rates are measured in
terms of averages of bid and offer rates.4
2.2 The effect of interventions on forecast errors for forward discounts
Following the existing literature cited in the introduction, we first examine the effect of Japanese
and U.S. interventions on the ex post forecast errors of forward discounts. As already mentioned, we
use as one-week forward discounts, it − i∗t , where it (i∗t ) denotes offshore yen interest rates (offshore
dollar interest rates) per week at time t. One-week-ahead (five-business-day-ahead) forecast errors
of forward discounts are defined as st+5 − st − (it − i∗t ). INT JPt+5 and INT PUSt+5 are the sums of
Japanese net dollar sales and U.S. net dollar sales between time t + 1 and t + 5 from the time
3 We could not obtain information on which markets authorities intervened in. The available intervention data are used for
empirical analysis based on the assumption that when foreign exchange markets are closed on a holiday in New York,
authorities can intervene in other foreign exchange markets, such as in Tokyo or London.
4 Spot exchange rates are measured at 17:00 New York time, while the average rates are quoted between 9:00 and 17:00
Japan time in Tokyo offshore money markets. Thus, the spot exchange rate and the forward discount based on offshore
rates are not measured at the same time. To take this timing issue into account, we also use offshore market rates quoted
on the next day (at time t + 1), and find that the estimation result does not differ from that based on the forward discount
quoted at time t.
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t perspective, respectively.5 Note that Japanese interventions at time t and U.S. interventions at
time t are reflected in spot rates at time t (st), which are measured at 17:00 New York time. Thus,
any immediate impact of current interventions on spot rates is not reflected in our estimation. We
consider immediate impacts and subsequent effects of future interventions on spot rates.
Our base model adopts the following standard GARCH-M specification:
st+5 − st − (it − i∗t ) = α1 + α2INT JPt+5 + α3INT USt+5 + μht
+ut + κ1ut−1 + κ2ut−2 + κ3ut−3 + κ4ut−4,
ut = vt
√
ht with vt ∼ N(0, 1),
ht = v1 + ηu2t−1 + λht−1.
In this specification, we assume a moving average structure of order four for the error term in order
to control for the effect of overlapping periods.6 As mentioned later, the premium associated with
the underlying volatility (μ) can be positive or negative in the case of exchange rates.
The coefficients on the sums of Japanese and U.S. net dollar sales (α2 and α3) measure not only
the immediate impacts of future interventions, but also their subsequent effects. For example, when
official interventions affect spot rates immediately but also have reversal or feedback effects on
subsequent spot rates that nullify the initial immediate market impacts, the sign of α2 (α3) depends
on the relative size of the initial market impacts and subsequent reversal effects.7 More concretely, if
market impacts remain larger than reversal effects within one week, α2 (α3) is negative. If reversal
effects completely cancel out market impacts within a week, α2 (α3) is zero. If reversal effects
dominate market impacts, then α2 (α3) is positive; that is, dollar-sales (purchase) interventions may
lead to dollar appreciation (depreciation).8
We refer to the case in which there is a negative α2 (α3) as the intended effect of interventions be-
cause, in that case, dollar sales (purchases) successfully prevent dollar appreciation (depreciation).
Similarly, when α2 (α3) is positive, there are unintended effects of interventions.
As mentioned in the previous subsection, Japanese intervention policy changed significantly in
the mid-1990s and the early 2000s. Thus, we estimate the above specification for not only the full
sample period between 1991 and 2004, but also for the three subsample periods (those from April
5 Arguably, we should use components of future interventions that are unpredictable at time t. This is because predictable
components are supposed to be reflected in current spot rates. However, using an econometric model to forecast official
interventions, predictable components are extremely small relative to actual interventions. Therefore, our estimation
results do not depend on whether we distinguish between unpredictable and predictable components.
6 We estimated other specifications, including GARCH models and GARCH models incorporating conditional volatility
(ht) dependent on interventions. We also estimated models specifying interventions as dollar-purchase and dollar-sale
dummies rather than as amounts. However, the empirical results from these specifications did not differ substantially
from those obtained from the standard GARCH-M specification.
7 Kearns and Rigobon (2005) find that Japanese interventions had weak reversal effects on subsequent spot rates.
8 Large-scale interventions may invite opposite transactions from speculators and thereby cause the subsequent reversal
effect to dominate the immediate market impact.
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1991 to June 1995, from June 1995 to December 2002, and from January 2003 to December 2004).
We correct the standard errors using the method proposed by Newey and West (1987).
Table1: Estimation results from forward premium equations with GARCH-M specification
?
?
Apr. 1, 1991 to
Dec. 28, 2004
Apr. 1, 1991 to
Jun. 20, 1995
Jun. 21, 1995 to
Dec. 31, 2002
Jan. 1, 2003 to
Dec. 28, 2004
Constant term (α1) 7.89 x E(-4)(5.41 x E(-4))
-1.76 x E(-4)
(8.55 x E(-4))
3.34 x E(-3)***
(7.67 x E(-4))
-1.86 x E(-3)
(1.20 x E(-3))
Japanese intervention over
coming five business days
(α2)
-5.64 x E(-7)***
(3.44 x E(-8))
2.72 x E(-6)***
(5.53 x E(-7))
-9.62 x E(-7)***
(5.94 x E(-8))
-3.17 x E(-7)***
(6.30 x E(-9))
U.S. intervention over coming
five business days (α3)
-1.06 x E(-5)***
(2.33 x E(-6))
-5.51 x E(-6)*
(3.16 x E(-6))
-5.92 x E(-5)***
(5.68 x E(-6))
?
?
GARCH characterization:
? Constant term (ν1)
2.98 x E(-6)***
(1.54 x E(-7))
3.79 x E(-6)***
(3.03 x E(-7))
2.89 x E(-6)***
(2.00 x E(-7))
1.86 x E(-5)***
(1.33 x E(-6))
? Lagged squared residual
? coefficient (η)
0.0820***
(2.10 x E(-3))
0.1075***
(4.87 x E(-3))
0.0755***
(2.56 x E(-3))
0.1529***
(0.0301)
? Lagged conditional variance
? coefficient (λ)
0.8834***
(1.93 x E(-3))
0.8471***
(4.05 x E(-3))
0.8927***
(2.46 x E(-3))
0.5033***
(0.0253)
GARCH-M parameter (μ) -15.5002**(6.3199)
-26.5418***
(9.9901)
-16.3369*
(8.4965)
-9.1494
(18.1229)
The number of usable
observations 3175 976 1736 455
?(1) The following GARCH-M model is estimated:
????? st+5 − st − (it − i∗t ) = α1 + α2 INT JPt+5 + α3INT USt+5 + μht + ut +
∑4
j=1 κ jut− j,
where ut = vt
√
ht , ht = v1 + ηu2t−1 + λht−1, and vt follows the N(0,1) distribution.
(2) E(−n) denotes 10−N .
(3) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(4) *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(5) Although a moving average structure of order four is applied to the error structure to control for the effect of
? overlapping periods, the above table does not report the estimated coefficients associated with these moving
? average components.
Table 1 reports the estimation results from the standard GARCH-M specification. For the full
sample, Japanese interventions generated the intended effect on subsequent changes in spot rates.
However, the estimation results depend on the choice of subsample period. Japanese interventions
yielded unintended effects in the first subsample. That is, dollar-sales (purchase) interventions
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resulted in subsequent dollar appreciation (depreciation). For the period between June 1995 and
December 2004, Japanese interventions had the intended effect on subsequent changes in spot rates.
In other words, Japanese dollar-purchase interventions caused subsequent depreciations of the yen.
These results are consistent with existing empirical studies such as those obtained by Ito (2003) and
Hillebrand and Schnabl (2003).
U.S. interventions had significant intended effects on subsequent spot rates throughout the sample
period. That is, dollar-sales (purchase) interventions resulted in subsequent dollar depreciations
(appreciations). This evidence for the intended effect of U.S. interventions is similar to the previous
studies including those of Baillie and Osterberg (2000) and Ito (2003).9
An increase in conditional volatility led to appreciation pressures on the yen in the first and
second subsamples. As Engel (1996) shows, the direction of the effect of the conditional variance
on risk premiums depends on the variance of nominal consumption in both dollar and yen terms.10
2.3 Implications for the forward discount puzzle
The mere presence of effects of official interventions on immediate and subsequent spot rates may
not completely determine the relationship between current forward discounts and future changes in
spot rates. As Fama (1984) discusses, the extent to which future intervention-induced effects are
correlated with current forward discounts is a key to the relationship between the two, and therefore
to the resolution of the forward premium puzzle. We evaluate the above estimation result based on
the argument of Fama (1984).
Suppose that subsequent changes in logarithmic spot rates are forecasted by current forward
discounts ( it − i∗t ) as follows:
st+5 − st = constant term + γ(it − i∗t ) + ut+5,
where ut+5 is the error term. If forward discounts serve as unbiased predictors for future changes in
spot rates, the estimator γ̂ = cov(st+5−st ,it−i
∗
t )
var(it−i∗t ) converges to unity with a constant term of zero.
If the intervention-induced component (Xt+5, which is a hidden component in the above forecast-
ing equation) is correlated with the current forward discount, then it follows that:
γ̂ = 1 +
cov(Xt+5, it − i∗t )
var(it − i∗t )
.
When the hidden component is related to official interventions, there are four possible cases in
9 As Ito (2003) points out, an explanatory variable for U.S. interventions may capture the impact of joint interventions by
Japanese and U.S. authorities.
10 Similarly, Fukuta and Saito (2002) show that the signs of the coefficients on risk premiums depend on the covariance
between consumption growth and inflation, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution, and the variances of inflation
in Japan and the U.S.
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which current forward discounts fail to serve as unbiased predictors of future changes in spot rates.
Suppose that interventions have unintended effects, or that αˆ2 or αˆ3 is positive. If future net dollar
sales are positively correlated with current forward discounts, then γ̂ > 1. That is, future spot rates
overreact to current forward rates. Conversely, if future net dollar sales are negatively correlated
with current forward discounts, then γ̂ < 1. In other words, interventions induce the opposite move-
ments between current forward discounts and future spot rates, which is regarded as the forward
discount puzzle.
When interventions generate intended effects and there is a negative αˆ2 or αˆ3, a positive correla-
tion between net dollar sales and current forward discounts results in γ̂ < 1, which corresponds to
the forward discount puzzle. Conversely, a negative correlation between net dollar sales and current
forward discounts yields γ̂ > 1; that is, there is an overreaction to forward discounts. In summary,
a negative correlation between net dollar sales and forward discounts under a positive αˆ2 (αˆ3), or a
positive correlation under a negative αˆ2 (αˆ3) resolves the forward discount puzzle.
Table 2-1: Correlation coefficients between forward discounts and interventions
?
?
Apr. 1, 1991 to
Dec. 28, 2004
Apr. 1, 1991 to
Jun. 20, 1995
Jun. 21, 1995 to
Dec. 31, 2002
Jan. 1, 2003 to
Dec. 28, 2004
Correlation coefficients between
forward discounts and the
one-week sums of Japanese and
U.S. interventions
-0.0720**
(0.0282)
0.3103***
(0.0830)
-0.0524
(0.0422)
-0.2915***
(0.0651)
Correlation coefficients between
forward discounts and the
one-week sum of Japanese
interventions
-0.0719**
(0.0282)
0.3055***
(0.0832)
-0.0526
(0.0423)
-0.2915***
(0.0651)
Correlation coefficient between
forward discounts and the
one-week sum of U.S. interventions
-0.0110
(0.0216)
0.2140***
(0.0759)
0.0013
(0.0143)
n. a.
?
?(1) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(2) *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
As reported in Table 2-2, the estimated γ̂ is −2.133 with a standard error 0.954 for the full
sample period; that is, the forward discount puzzle is apparent for the entire sample period. For
the full sample, Table 1 shows that both Japanese and U.S. interventions have intended effects with
a negative αˆ2 and αˆ3. However, Table 2-1 shows that future Japanese and U.S. interventions are
negatively correlated with current forward discounts. Thus, these two results indicate that official
interventions did not induce opposite movements between current forward discounts and future spot
rates, but they did induce an overreaction of future spot rates to current forward discounts.
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Table 2-2: Prediction biases of regression coefficients of forward discounts on changes in
spot rates with and without adjusting intervention-induced movements
?
?
Apr. 1, 1991 to
Dec. 28, 2004
Apr. 1, 1991 to
Jun. 20, 1995
Jun. 21, 1995 to
Dec. 31, 2002
Jan. 1, 2003 to
Dec. 28, 2004
Estimated γ without adjustment -2.1328**(0.9543)
3.0133
(2.4367)
-1.8081
(2.3638)
12.8623
(17.2654)
Estimated γ with adjustment
based on the terms associated
with Japanese and U.S.
interventions
-2.4482**
(0.9639)
1.4033
(2.2481)
-2.3321
(2.4576)
2.9130
(17.3076)
Estimated γ with adjustment
based on the terms associated
with Japanese interventions
-2.4255**
(0.9632)
0.9410
(2.1920)
-2.3484
(2.4625)
2.9130
(17.3076)
Estimate γ with adjustment
based on the terms associated
with U.S. interventions
-2.1555**
(0.9544)
3.4756
(2.5092)
-1.7918
(2.3574)
n. a.
?
?(1) The nonadjusted coefficient, γ, is estimated from the following regression:
????? st+5 − st = constant + γ(it − i∗t ) + εt+5,
where εt+5 denotes the error term. The coefficient, γ, with adjustment based on the terms associated with Japanese
and U.S. interventions is estimated from the following equations:
????? st+5 − st − αˆ2INT JPt+5 − αˆ3 INTUSt+5 = constant + γ(it − i∗t ) + εt+5,
where αˆ2 and αˆ3 are the estimated coefficients reported in Table 1. The coefficient, γ, with adjustment based on
the terms associated with Japanese and U.S. interventions separately is estimated by replacing the left-hand
side of the above equation with st+5 − st − αˆ2INT JPt+5 and st+5 − st − αˆ3INT USt+5 , respectively.
(2) Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
(3) *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
As shown in Table 2-2, regressing the change in spot rates adjusted by intervention-induced
components, (st+5 − st)−αˆ2INT JPt+5−αˆ3INT USt+5 , on the current forward discount, yields an significant
estimate γ̂ of −2.448. This is more negative than the estimate of −2.133 based on no adjustment.
For the full sample, the consideration of intervention-induced movements would not help to resolve
the forward discount puzzle.
Because there are different patterns in the impacts of official interventions on spot rates in the
three subsample periods, we investigate how official interventions affect the relationship between
forward discounts and future spot rates in each subsample period. As Table 2-1 shows, current
forward discounts are positively correlated with future Japanese interventions for the subsample
period from April 1991 to June 1995, and negatively correlated for the subsample period between
January 2003 and December 2004, at the 1 percent significance level. Thus, Japanese interven-
tions are likely to affect the relationship between forward discounts and future spot rates for these
subsample periods.
As reported in Table 2-2, for the subsample period from April 1991 to June 1995, the estimated
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γ̂ of 3.013 is well in excess of unity, and has a standard error of 2.437; that is, while the estimated
coefficient is not significant, spot rates tended to overreact to forward discounts. As empirically
examined in the previous section, Japanese interventions had unintended immediate and subsequent
effects on spot rates in the corresponding subsample period. Given the above argument, a positive
correlation between net dollar sales by the Japanese authority and forward discounts would generate
such an overreaction. As shown in Table 2-1, Japanese interventions are positively correlated with
current forward discounts, it − i∗t , at the 1 percent significance level. To examine the effect of
Japanese interventions, we regress the adjusted change in spot rates, (st+5 − st) − αˆ2INT JPt+5, on the
current forward discount. We find that the estimated γ̂ has fallen from 3.013 to closer to unity
(0.941). That is, current forward discounts could serve as unbiased predictors for future spot rates
after adjustments of intervention-induced components.
U.S. interventions, on the other hand, had its intended impacts on spot rates, and are positively
correlated with current forward discounts at the 1 percent significance level (see Table 2-1). This im-
plies that the consideration of U.S. interventions by adopting (st+5 − st)− αˆ3INT USt+5 as a dependent
variable would cause the estimated γ̂ to further exceed unity, thereby magnifying the overreaction
of spot rates to forward discounts.
As reported in Table 2-2, we find an overreaction of spot rates to forward discounts in the third
subsample period from January 2003 to December 2004; the estimated γ̂ of 12.862 is far in excess
of unity and has a standard error 17.265. Again, although the estimated coefficient is not signifi-
cant, spot rates tended to overreact to forward discounts. In that subsample period, a significantly
negative correlation between net dollar sales and current forward discounts (reported in Table 2-1)
together with Japanese interventions having its intended effect would help to explain this observed
overreaction. The consideration of the component induced by Japanese interventions causes the
estimated γ̂ to change from 12.862 to 2.913.
In the second subsample period between June 1995 and December 2002 (see Table 2-2), the
estimated γ̂ of −1.808 is negative, with a standard error 2.364. That is, there is some weak evidence
that the forward discount puzzle arose in that period. However, as reported in Table 2-1, for this
subsample period, both Japanese and U.S. interventions are only weakly correlated with forward
discounts. Hence, the consideration of intervention-induced movements would not help to resolve
the forward discount puzzle.
3 Discussion
In this paper, we explored how official interventions affect the relationship between current for-
ward discounts and future changes in spot rates of the yen/dollar for the period between 1991 and
2004. According to our empirical investigation, Japanese interventions did not induce opposite
movements between current forward discounts and future spot rates, as has been frequently docu-
mented in the literature on the forward discount puzzle; rather, this caused an overreaction of spot
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rates to forward discounts. In particular, the unintended effect of Japanese interventions, together
with a positive correlation between net dollar sales and forward discounts, caused spot rates to
overreact in the first half of the 1990s. For that subsample period, current forward discounts could
serve as unbiased predictors for future spot rates after adjustments of intervention-induced com-
ponents. The intended effect of Japanese interventions, with a negative correlation, also generated
such overreactions in the early 2000s.
We have two remarks on these empirical findings concerning Japanese interventions. First, inter-
ventions by the Japanese authority tended to yield more responsive movements in the spot rate than
dictated by intertemporal efficiency (interest parity relationship). Second, because there is evidence
of the forward discount puzzle for the whole sample period, other effects were sufficiently strong to
dominate the intervention-induced overreaction.
(Associate Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
(Professor, Faculty of Economics, Hitotsubashi University)
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